University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

4-1-2018

To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a Bureaucratic Age
John Henry Schlegel
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Legal Education Commons

Recommended Citation
John H. Schlegel, To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a Bureaucratic Age, 66 Buff. L. Rev. 435 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/914

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

ESSAY
To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a
Bureaucratic Age
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL†
I
“It’s late, . . . we must go and dress for dinner. For a few
hours I have to act the part of a civilized man.”1 Thus did
Fabrizio Corbèra, Prince of Salina, a Sicilian aristocrat and
so a part of the court of the recently deposed Spanish
Bourbon ruler of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, dismiss an
emissary of Victor Emmanuel of Savoy, ruler of the Kingdom
of Sardinia, soon to be the first king of a mostly united Italy.
This emissary had asked Don Fabrizio to accept royal
appointment as a member of the Senate of the new country,
a constitutional monarchy. Don Fabrizio had declined.
Of course, Don Fabrizio, the Leopard, so called because
that animal dominated the family crest, is a largely fictional
character, modeled after the great-grandfather of the author,
Giuseppe di Lampedusa, himself a Sicilian aristocrat. The
time depicted in The Leopard is, however, real—the few

† U.B. Distinguished Professor of Law at the University at Buffalo, State
University of New York. Jim Gardner’s effort in helping me think out this
problem has been invaluable. A faculty seminar at the University at Buffalo
School of Law was both helpful and enlightening. Conversations with Guyora,
Michael, Joe, Tony, Matt and Bert were separately useful. Mark Fenster provided
the Simpsons reference.
1. GUISEPPI DI LAMPEDUSA, THE LEOPARD 213 (Archibald Colquhoun trans.,
Pantheon Books Inc. 1960) (1958). The book was later made into one of Luchino
Visconti’s arguably best movies, staring Bert Lancaster, Claudia Cardinale and
Alan Delon. IL GATOPARDO (Twentieth Century Fox 1963).
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years of the Risorgimento following Garibaldi’s invasion of
first Sicily, and thereafter the mainland around Naples. The
novel is thus a portrait of an aristocracy in decline as the
expanding bourgeois middle class begins its ascendancy.
Among the many reasons the Prince gave for his
unwillingness to serve in the new Senate, two stand out. The
first is about Sicily.
You talked to me about a young Sicily facing the marvels of the
modern world; for my part I see instead a centenarian being dragged
in a Bath chair around the Great Exhibition in London,
understanding nothing and caring about nothing, whether it’s the
steel factories of Sheffield or the cotton spinners of
Manchester . . . .2

The second is about himself.
I am a member of the old ruling class, inevitably compromised with
the Bourbon regime, and tied to it by chains of decency, if not of
affection. I belong to an unfortunate generation, swung between the
old world and the new, and I find myself ill at ease in both. And
what is more . . . I am without illusions; what would the Senate do
with me, an inexperienced legislator who lacks the faculty of selfdeception, essential requisite for wanting to guide others? We of our
generation must draw aside and watch the capers and somersaults
of the young around this ornate catafalque. Now you need young
men, bright young men, with minds asking ‘how’ rather than ‘why’
and who are good at masking, at blending . . . their personal
interests with vague public ideals.3

And yet, despite Don Fabrizio’s obvious distaste for the
concerns and values of the rising middle class and his sense
of representing the values of a time past, he almost
immediately suggests that the emissary consider a different
appointee. That candidate is the quite unpolished, perhaps
better seen as uncouth, but nonetheless wealthy. He is soon
to be the father-in-law of the Don’s favorite, but

2.

DI LAMPEDUSA,

3. Id. at 209.

supra note 1, at 205–06.
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impoverished nephew, Tancredi. This young man had
defended his choice to join Garibaldi’s troops, by saying to his
disapproving uncle, “Unless we ourselves take a hand now,
they’ll foist a republic on us; if we want things to stay as they
are, things must change.”4
What is to be made of Don Fabrizio, a man who finds the
future so much more than unappetizing that he is unwilling
to participate in it, but yet is willing to attempt to advance
the potential interests of his headstrong nephew, a young
man who has already broken the heart of the Don’s eldest
daughter? How should one respond to an unappetizing
future, one whose job is “to guide others?” Should one play
the part of a “civilized man,” and so “dress for dinner,” or
instead “take a hand now,” lest the future be even worse?
This question is a serious one for me. My students face a
future that undermines the values that have grounded my
teaching since I began this strange activity. However, before
facing up to these questions, it seems useful to review a
contrasting version of the Leopard’s story, this time in a film
set about seventy years later. Change is coming, not to Sicily,
but to somewhere along the Tennessee River, the Wild River
of the film’s title, in the form of the Tennessee Valley
Authority’s (TVA) attempt to tame that river by building a
series of dams that would also provide plentiful electric
power to the area.5 The story is not told from the point of

4. Id. at 40.
5. WILD RIVER (Twentieth Century Fox 1960) is an Elia Kazan movie staring
Montgomery Clift, Lee Remick and Jo van Fleet. The screenplay of Wild River
was written by Paul Osborne, known for writing the screenplays of South Pacific,
East of Eden, The Yearling, The World of Suzie Wong and Sayonara. He fashioned
the story from two books. Mud on the Stars provided the location, including the
river island farm, and the character of Ella Garth. See generally WILLIAM
BRADFORD HUIE, MUD ON THE STARS (1942). Dunbar’s Cove provided the young
TVA bureaucrat who falls in love with a relative of a property owner, though in
this novel the country farmer who is central to the story is the father of the girl,
not the grandmother. See generally BORDEN DEAL, DUNBAR’S COVE (1957). Neither
novel provided significant dialog, though the last paragraph of the second
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view of the Leopard, but from that of Tancredi, of the younger
generation, represented by Chuck Glover, an earnest,
idealistic, naïve young man sent out from TVA headquarters
in Washington to handle a problem.
The problem is Ella Garth, matriarch to a rather
unsavory clan of hardscrabble farmers, and an even larger
collection of negroes, probably sharecroppers, working a soon
to be flooded island in the middle of the Tennessee River.
Chuck’s task is to convince Ella to sell her land and move to
better housing higher up in the valley—a task that several
others have undertaken, only to fail. Washington is afraid
that there will be political repercussions if Ella is either
forced off her land or left there and stubbornly drowns.
Chuck is their go-to guy.
After Chuck’s first attempt to meet Ella results in his
being thrown in the river by her “boys,” the old woman sends
them to apologize for the rough treatment. Assuming that
the apology is an invitation of sorts, Chuck returns only to be
told by Ella that she will not sell
the land I’ve poured my heart’s blood in. You don’t love the land.
You love your land. ‘Electricity,’ I expect that’s what you call
progress. Taking away people’s souls, putting electricity in place of
them, ain’t progress. Not the way I see it.6

Still, Ella tells the negroes that they may leave the
island and makes no effort to dissuade her granddaughter,
Carol, who is falling in love with Chuck, from doing so as
well.
Two more trips back to the island, the first drunk and
the second to apologize for having been drunk, do nothing to
change Ella’s mind, and indeed leave Chuck crying out, “Mrs.
Garth, what are you trying to prove?” to a resolutely closed
door. In the end, it takes an order of eviction, signed by a
federal judge and served by a U.S. marshal to force Ella,
provided the movie’s title.
6

WILD RIVER (Twentieth Century Fox 1960).

2018]

TO DRESS FOR DINNER

439

wearing her good cloth coat, to leave. When her
granddaughter offers to carry a small, obviously cardboard
suitcase, Ella refuses and, as she walks past Chuck,
commands, “Well, what you waiting for.” Though she settles
into the new house that Chuck has had specially constructed
for her, complete with a porch for her rocker, Ella dies as soon
as her land is inundated. Chuck and Carol leave for a new
life in Washington.
The structural similarities between The Leopard and
Wild River are obvious, though less interesting than their
differences. Ella, like Don Fabrizio, sees an abhorrent future
and draws back from it. Though less willing than he to
compromise with that future, she makes it clear, as does the
Don, that she will not interfere with the choice of the younger
generation, with Carol’s new found love or with the desire of
the negroes to secure better housing and well-paying, if
temporary, jobs off the island. But, Wild River is a movie
focused on the young people. Like Tancredi, Chuck has
enlisted as an agent of the future order. However, unlike
Tancredi, Chuck comes to doubt the value of that order when,
as a result of his interaction with Ella in her stubbornness,
he realizes that the progress that the TVA brings to the
valley—electricity and housing and industry—will destroy a
way of life that, if not attractive to him, is at least meaningful
to those living in that valley. He tries to temporize on behalf
of the new order, but only after the old one shows its ugly
underside—two sound thrashings delivered by the town
bully, a defender of the old ways, especially white
supremacy—can Chuck act decisively in favor of the newer
one that brought him to the valley in the first place. And so
his indecision adds another question to our initial ones. Is it
plausible to temporize between past, present and future?
II
Let me start to answer these questions by first acquiring
an understanding of the past and a glimpse of the future.
Born, raised, and educated in the Midwest, I attended the
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University of Chicago Law School at a time when law and
economics was anything but central to an overwhelmingly
politically conservative curriculum, and left understanding
that law, at least when well-practiced, was a matter of
handicraft. My guess is that most of my classmates came out
with a similar understanding. Whether the matter at hand
was a complex financial transaction or a piece of litigation,
the lawyer’s job was the same—to fashion the judicial and
legislative materials of law and the conventional ways of its
practice into a form that would accomplish a given client’s
purpose as well as could be done, and hopefully that would
manage to transform these materials at hand into a “better,”
“more just”—most of us thought we knew what those words
meant—species of law.
Though Robert Hutchins, patron saint of the University,
if not its Law School, may have derided “the how to do it” law
school,7 I did not experience legal education as an example of
the teaching of low level practice, but as technê, as knowledge
gained from doing, much as knowledge of legal theory is
gained from doing the critical analysis of judicial and
legislative materials. Indeed, it was the experience of lowlevel practice, of the preparation of the summons and
complaint or the notice of motion together with the proof of
service, which was the surprise. Working out the theory that
informed the complaint or the proper way of presenting the
argument in a brief and then preparing these documents met
our expectations of what it was to be a lawyer. If I had
complained about law school’s failure to prepare me for
practice, it would have been about a failure to sufficiently
stress the theory that informed practice—for example the
theoretical understanding of how to translate a rule of law
into a set of allegations in a complaint sufficient to withstand
a motion to dismiss.

7. See Robert M. Hutchins, The University Law School, in THE LAW SCHOOL
5, 5–6 (David Haber & Julius Cohen
eds., 1968).
OF TOMORROW: THE PROJECTION OF AN IDEAL
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My experience of practice was of a hard, but honest living
in a legal services office. I was professionally offended when
an opponent too openly or too un-self-consciously turned the
practice of law into a routine activity, whether it was by filing
what was obviously the same motion to dismiss with the
same brief, or the same set of boilerplate discovery requests
in every case without regard to the narrow case-specific
considerations that made cases distinguishable, indeed
separately interesting. Such actions turned into a matter of
vulgar, bureaucratic regularity something that I understood
as anything but.
All of which was not to say that I did not experience from
time to time the desultory routinization of law; I practiced in
the Municipal Court of Chicago where, if papers were not
ordered so that the check covering fees was on top of the
summons which was on top of the complaint, the clerk would
discipline the offender by throwing the pile back at the
attorney filing the case in such a way that these papers
would land on the dirty floor. Nevertheless, such experiences
were to be counted as deviations, and unwelcome ones, from
what was legal practice properly understood.
When I entered teaching, I experienced a difference
between the law school I had been graduated from and the
one at which I taught. At Chicago, only the insane worried
about passing the bar exam. At Buffalo, where I began and
remain teaching, a significant portion of the students were
concerned about bar passage and rightly so, given the high
degree of correlation between LSAT score and bar passage.
This was not an elite school. Yet, a significant portion of my
students saw law pretty much as I had. It was a handicraft
and an absorbing one. These students were hungry to learn
what this handicraft was all about, what needed to be known
in order to be good at it. Of course, questions of earning a
living were never suppressed; most nascent producers of
handcrafted products recognize the need to earn a living.
Still, it was not then implausible for a dean to wish his
graduates that they should experience law as a matter of
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“doing well, by doing good,” in Ben Franklin’s words. In line
with such a vision of what it was to be a lawyer, many
students understood, or at least acted as if they understood,
that learning was significantly a matter of grasping the
“why” of law—the theories, and so, the reasons that informed
both bodies of doctrine and the various practices of lawyers.
So, for them, critique of such theories was a crucial part of
learning the law, a part of becoming a lawyer.
Today, I most often experience a very different
understanding of law and lawyering on the largest part of my
students. They are anything but hungry to learn. Perhaps
they are sated even from too much learning. Pride in craft is
noticeably lacking except for a few students taking courses
that seem to them to be narrowly relevant to a future
practice clearly envisioned.8 Indeed, the transformation of
“relevance” from being central to a sixties plea for more
courses related to contemporary social problems, to being
central to a demand for courses of ever more narrowly
conceived short-term usefulness, is a source of sadness.9
In this world of law study, critique, a central part of my
8. A good example are the students taking my colleagues’ courses, Isabel
Marcus’ class on domestic violence or Judith Olin’s similar clinic.
9. I experienced the late sixties cry for “relevance” as a category mistake, a
failure to understand the theoretical centrality of the verbs “to get” and “to spend”
to the law’s understanding of itself. Some people will be surprised at this
statement, coming as it does from a still self-identifying member of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies (CLS). While there is reason to question
that affiliation, as some members of the group have done, because I found the
critique part of CLS more to my liking than some of the politics which I found
anything but capable of surviving the application of that critique, what I shared
then with most of the CLS crew, and still hold now, is a dislike of liberal
politics/policy/political theory. The endless balancing of this against that has
always offended me because it avoids the obligation of anyone purporting to
represent another or to judge on behalf of a polity to recognize the positional
obligation to exercise judgment, to choose, and so, to accept that obligation as a
personal one, as putting one’s being on the line, as it were. The endless wringing
of one’s hands at the tragedy of choice has long struck me as the best evidence
that liberals are psychologically unfit to govern, in any of the senses of that
polysemous word, for accompanying their every choice is always an attempt to
deflect criticism with a prepared apology. Fitness to govern is better evidenced
by the willingness to accept criticism of choice and act upon it when appropriate.
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experience of legal education, is an unwelcome intrusion into
the job of becoming a lawyer. Indeed, at times, it seems that
almost everything other than the thinnest, narrowest, most
quickly comprehended material, delivered much as the
classic heroin addict’s plea, “straight in the arm,” is an
imposition on the life of the law student, a life conceived as
moving on, getting this over with, as an endless series of
occasions to hit the “page down” button on the computer
program that is learning. Maybe even on the computer
program that is life.
There seems to be no time patiently to learn a handicraft
either, and if there were time, no inclination to use such time
in this way. Any decrease in the breadth of materials covered
in any class is no longer an occasion for exploring the
remaining material in more detail in the name of gaining a
better sense of how law works, but is taken as a contribution
toward an ever-expanding pile of unnamed, possibly
unnamable, other things to do. Training in legal research
and writing seems to be a hurdle to be jumped over, a hurdle
seen in terms of the minutiae of citation form and routine,
idiomatic legal usage, but not as an occasion to work on the
primary task of producing argument in readable, effective
English prose. And both seem to be completely divorced from
the activity of keeping a job once that elusive goal, on which
all student attention seems to be focused, is attained.
III
In struggling to understand why and how this change
took place, I can offer two accounts. One emphasizes
interrelated alterations in the structure of the American
university and of the economy in which the legal practice for
which our students understand themselves to be preparing,
takes place. The other emphasizes changes in the cultural
practices and outlooks that our students bring with them to
law school. These accounts are not mutually exclusive,
though they may be mutually reinforcing and likely reflect
similar underlying social tectonics. For present purposes,
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these possible interactions are not particularly important.
Start by revisiting the history of the social formation that
is the American university. The contemporary university is
not the descendant of the small denominational college of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, though some
prominent universities have such a lineage. Rather, it is the
descendant of the German university, specifically von
Humboldt’s University of Berlin. Von Humboldt conceived of
an institution combining the faculty’s practice of
Wissenschaft, the acquisition of objective, scholarly
knowledge about the worlds of nature and of human affairs
designed to disclose the truth, seen as a philosophical unity,
and its transmission of this knowledge to students who
independently were attempting to develop their own
wissenschaftlich understanding of the world. Both faculty
and students were thus participating in the lifelong process
of Bildung, the development of an individual’s intellectual
and moral, that is, human potential—a potential
encompassing the ideal of the cultivated man embedded in a
fully social and political context. This cultural unity was
expected to create, and so to embody, the core of an ethnic
German nation-state.
The students that von Humboldt envisioned for his
ethnic German university were of the minor nobility and the
various parts of the non-noble upper classes. He understood
that the male children of the narrow middle class were to be
remitted to the Technishe Hochschules or Instituten. When,
in the 1870s, von Humboldt’s ideas were transferred to the
United States, two problems needed to be faced: cultural
unity and social relations. The nation lacked von Humboldt’s
idealist understanding of a cultural identity that might serve
as the philosophical unity for the American state. And the
lack of a nobility meant that the American social structure
was far different from the German.10

10. John Henry Schlegel, From High in the Paper Tower, An Essay on Von
Humboldt’s University, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 865, 867–68 (2004).
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When it came to establishing a cultural identity, the best
the American university could do was to produce a student
well-versed in American letters and, even here, there were
problems. As a result of the Morrill Act of 1862, which
provided for the support of “agriculture and the mechanic
arts,” technical training was to be had within the university,
not outside of it.11 American letters was hardly a central part
of such a technical education. Still, letters had the advantage
that it was vaguely continuous with the curriculum of the
denominational college that had long provided some students
with a pre-professional education for the study of law,
medicine, and theology. Such a traditional curriculum had
included a modicum of science and political economy. So,
when in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the sciences professionalized and the social sciences hived off
into their own, separate professional orders, letters came to
stand as central to a broader range of studies—the “liberal
arts” (and sciences). Still, identifying a unity that might hold
together the American university of professionally
fragmented arts and sciences departments, various technical
fields, such as engineering, and professional schools, such as
medicine and law, was anything but easy.
A changing social structure presented equally difficult
problems. The denominational college had long served the
slender upper and upper-middle classes. That relationship
continued in the growing American university. However, the
change from an agricultural and commercial economy to one
that was centered in mass manufacturing and
transportation networks brought the appearance of a new
piece of the middle class: middle management. This group,
variously found in both the upper-middle and the oncelargely artisanal, middle-middle classes, now had choices of
where and how to educate its children and exercised them.
Some invested in social class and so sent their children away
11. Land-Grant Agricultural and Mechanical College Act of 1862, Pub. L. No.
37-130, 12 Stat. 503, 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–349
(2012)).
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for the liberal arts education that supposedly fit them for the
professions. Others, perhaps less economically secure, or
maybe only less delusional, sent theirs away with the hope
that they would receive a more technical education, which
came to include the business school. By the 1930s, social
fragmentation
had
thus
reinforced
educational
fragmentation.
Interestingly, the Cold War that followed the much
hotter World War II initially lead to an increased emphasis
on letters, renamed literary studies. Such studies were
briefly seen as the core of Western values, and so Western
higher education, understood as in opposition to the more
science- and technology-centered Communist values, and so,
Eastern higher education. But soon, the prestige of science
derived from wartime engineering and the “Sputnik crisis”
brought a sense that the worlds of science and letters were
so different that, in C.P. Snow’s words, they comprised “two
cultures.”12 Any further pretense that the university
represented a cultural unity became impossible.
Within the university, the response to this impossibility
was the substitute of a superficial, but at least substantive,
cultural unity that was literary studies, with an artificial
one—a culture of excellence, sometime derided as the
University of Excellence.13 Excellence was a classic post12. See generally C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND A SECOND LOOK (1963).
13. The University of Excellence is brutally, but wonderfully explored in BILL
READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUINS (1996), a book that would be required
reading for every university leader were it not written in the obscure language of
Eighties and Nineties LitCrit.
Friends have objected to my endorsement of Readings’ excoriation of the term
“excellence” as utterly lacking substance. They argue that much of Readings’
attack is leveled against a straw man as no one really believes that “excellence”
is something that can be recommended or pursued without an underlying
conception of in what it consists. Instead, excellence can only exist in relation to
role-specific behavior, and can only be measured by the standards applicable to
some particular role and so what Readings really objects to is the watered-down
conception of excellence that in his view the modern university not only pursues,
but also inculcates. This is a well-meant observation, but dubious to anyone who
has listened carefully to a half hour of presidential rhetoric and chooses to
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modern absence, a space without quality that thus could be
filled with any metric. Internally, it quite quickly became the
University of Administration, as non-teaching professionals
multiplied like coat hangers in a dark closet. As part of a
society obsessed with the ever-changing language of
management, as well as its definition of value as output per
unit cost, the University’s metrics were both financial and
resource
utilization—tuition
dollars and
full-time
equivalents (FTEs). Externally, the absence was quickly and
quite arbitrarily filled with assessments, rankings or whathave-yous that measured nothing in the world at all, but
instead reflected back the measurer’s preferences, generally
understood as an ordinal array; although the objects
measured, whether universities as a whole or schools or
programs with in them, quite likely were close to normally
distributed. The culture of excellence became the culture of
the treadmill—endless striving to catch up with the everadvancing leaders in a race for distinct advantage, but with
indistinct purpose.
Meanwhile, major changes were taking place in the
American social structure. At the end of World War II, the
economy of high wages and high prices that was legislated,
though not experienced, during the Depression created a
substitute an irrelevant word, say “kale,” every time that “excellence” appears.
The meaning changes not one wit, but it quickly becomes obvious that it is
particularly inappropriate for an institution of higher education to play this fast
and loose with signifiers.
Even more disreputable is the obvious meaning that is the University of Excellence. The University’s excellence is that of a discipline and its norms and of
peer review. Ironically, this is the revenge of the professionalization process that
created the American university. By making knowing possible, the disciplines
now act through their credentialing function to limit the knowable as well. Taken
together, the university’s bureaucratic personnel process and its disciplinary
base thus have created a species of tyranny designed to avoid the difficult judgment of the individual value of a scholar’s, a department’s or even a university’s
scholarship, by means of the endless deferral of judgment to others who similarly
defer their judgment to others, who similarly defer their judgment, ad infinitum,
ad nauseum. Real excellence is personal to the actor. The judgmental buck stops
there and so humility on the part of humans is required, in contrast to the arrogance of disciplinary self-assurance, and so self-satisfaction.
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twenty-five-year boom. Accompanying this boom was both a
population explosion, the Baby Boom, and a great downward
expansion of the middle class as unionized workers,
primarily in mass manufacturing industries, experienced
middle class earnings for the first time. The existence of a
mass middle class made aspirations for social advancement
easier to envision and at the same time made delineations of
the subtle substrata of that class more difficult, as the color
of the worker’s collar lost salience. Given the purportedly
meritocratic bias that distinguishes our relatively
democratic, but hardly egalitarian society, the expansion of
college education that followed with the adolescence of the
children who comprised the Baby Boom generation meant
that college graduation changed from a clean marker of
upper-middle class status to no more than a secure grip on
middle-middle class status.
These boom years were followed by the Great Inflation of
the seventies, which was in turn followed by another boom in
the eighties and nineties. Inflation followed by boom
partially hid the hollowing out of the unionized mass
manufacturing sector, turned one wage earner families into
two wage earner families, and stripped out many middle
management jobs from newly leaner corporate entities. It
also brought a great expansion of low-wage service
employment and an increase in the cubicle warrior jobs that
required a college degree, neither of which offered a clear
route to middle management. These changes squeezed the
newly expanded middle class and stressed families
generally.
Increasingly, it seemed that the only sure route to a
well-paying job, and so a weak, necessary, but hardly
sufficient, grip on upper-middle class status, was either a
technical degree, often including a master’s degree, or a postgraduate professional degree. Thus, protecting one’s high
school GPA began to take on inordinate importance as a
strong transcript, together with strong standardized
admission test scores and endless participation in
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“activities,” seemed to be the only way to secure a place in
one of the “better” colleges or universities.
Once in college, the same concerns—transcript, test
scores and activities—dominated student life, for college had
turned from an objective to a stop, but not necessarily a rest,
along the achievement highway. As a result, the broad,
cultural education offered in the traditional liberal arts
declined in attractiveness, then fell by the wayside. In
technical fields, the same thing happened to those
undergraduate and graduate courses that were deemed
irrelevant to burnishing credentials for any necessary
certification test or future employment. In sum, for students,
von Humboldt’s university had turned into either an overly
administered, but not very effective, employment service or
several tune up laps around the track before the next big
challenge—getting a place in one of the “better” graduate or
professional schools.
Given these changes in the social understanding of
undergraduate education, it is hardly surprising that law
students, already inhabitants of the world that von
Humboldt’s university has become, might easily slide, if not
jump, into disconnecting the substance of professional
education from the goal of getting and keeping employment.
For them, getting the job might come to be understood as the
important part, the affirmation of a desirable and so desired
social status, the paper prerequisite for entering the uppermiddle class. In contrast, keeping that job, doing law, might
just as easily be understood primarily as participation in a
bureaucratic enterprise of the kind that students regularly
had passed through, successfully they might add, for close to
twenty years. And in a very real sense, such students would
not be wrong.
Consider social status first—always a good idea in a
status-conscious, status-denying county. As is the case with
any marker of status, its achievement is easily separated
from its content. It is precisely this separation that the U.S.
News & World Report rankings of everything play into. A
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question about what one might have learned became easily
subsumed into the question of where one might have learned.
A top-twenty school offered more cachet than a top-forty
school and a top-five, more than a top-twenty, though a
degree from none of these schools offered but insignificant
evidence that anything at all had been learned, especially
given the obvious correlation between parent social status,
standardized test scores, and institutional rank. In such a
world, it is far more important to get to the finish line with
an unscarred academic record than to learn anything.
Indeed, learning may be irrelevant. Again, given the
modestly democratic ethos of our society, an ethos that
pushes for the production of more, similarly credentialed
individuals, rather than fewer, better-trained ones, most
employers make their initial cut of whom to interview wholly
on the basis of the status of the school and the relative place
in the graduating class of the student. Only after exercising
this easy rule of thumb is there any good reason for such
employers to begin to cull among the similarly qualified by
relying on personality, dress, handshake, eye contact,
quickness, and other obvious, but irrelevant surrogates for
having learned something useful. After all, if the first hire
doesn’t work out because the degree and the smile
accompanying it hides the absence of, rather than evidences
the acquisition of, useful knowledge, there always will be
many more candidates in line to fill the job. In a world where
employers act in this way, spending time building a resume
and improving networking skills may indeed be a better use
of a law student’s time than learning the refinements of any
body of doctrine or marginally improving the ability to craft
an argument in an already wholly clichéd English language
or even acquiring a better understanding of the institutions
with which clients regularly interact.
Second, consider the nature of legal practice that young
lawyers experience today. However plausible it once was to
understand legal practice as a species of handicraft when I
was in law school—after all, the modern form of plea
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bargaining dates no later than the twenties prosecutions for
Prohibition violations and the routinization of tort cases
dates from a similar time when the automobile became a
ubiquitous part of the urban landscape—it is wholly bizarre
to see most contemporary legal practice as other than a
species of bureaucratic administration, or at least as an
enterprise of mass production. Handcrafting personalized
legal solutions to client problems still survives in the
representation of the wealthiest families and the most
prosperous businesses, in small subspecies of governmental
representation and in the more exotic corners of public
interest practice, but it has largely disappeared everywhere
else. A mass society brings bureaucratic solutions to its
problems. Forms are so ubiquitous in our society that we
seldom even notice them.
The best evidence of the bureaucratic nature of
contemporary legal practice is the wild proliferation of
paraprofessionals in even the fanciest of law firms. The
faithful secretary who “ran” the office for small practitioners
with concentrated practices—for example, real estate,
divorce, worker’s compensation, probate, or personal
bankruptcy—is both long storied and evidence of the
routinization of many practices during the mid-twentieth
century. But the expansion of such routine work into areas
of finance and litigation in the largest firms, well enough
known that it has become fodder for novels and movies, says
mountains about the nature of such practice, as well as about
the difficulty of creating a model for the delivery of legal
services that can support partner salaries in such firms at
their immodest level, a level initially driven by investment
banker envy, but eventually by reported per partner
earnings of competitors—a level way above lifestyle needs.
Here again can be seen, but on the law firm side, the
unthinking adoption of the ever-changing language of
management, as well as its definition of value as output per
unit cost.
If examples of serious and sustained handcrafted
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production of legal work are seldom to be experienced, it is
not surprising that students should act as if knowledge of
how to do such things is largely irrelevant to their education.
The ability carefully to craft a complaint or brief is of little
importance if most of the jobs that students can conceive of
consist primarily of moving paper from the right side of the
desk to the left. And much the same is the case where the
dollar amount of a transaction severely constrains the dollar
amount of fees that can be justified by, and so the hours that
can reasonably be devoted to, generating the perfect set of
transactional documents. How students can come to
understand such things before having experienced practice
has long escaped me, but then, deep cultural understandings
are often quite mysterious. Indeed, since entering law school,
I have been bewildered by how it is that students come to law
school believing that learning law is learning doctrine when
they have never been there before—not that this is their only
misconception.
IV
Here, then, is where the historical account should be
supplemented by an account that acknowledges the cultural
aspects of what as a law teacher I find myself experiencing—
the raw phenomenology of attempting to teach today’s
students. On a daily basis, the dominant feature of the
landscape I inhabit as teacher is, after all, the behavior of
students in the classroom, and, in particular, the aspects of
character that appear to guide their behavior in ways that
are, if not impossible to comprehend, at least deeply
dismaying to behold. Much has changed over forty years.
First and foremost—and here the historical-economic
account is most directly relevant—many of our students,
perhaps most, don’t really want to be lawyers. Or, to put this
more accurately, they don’t really want to be lawyers in the
sense that I understand what it means to want to be a
lawyer. I speak here not of motivations to enter the practice
of law—to right wrongs, to help the helpless, to make good
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money, to get into politics, to wait out a bad economy, to
satisfy one’s parents; students have always entered law
schools with some mix of these motivations and still do.
Rather, students do not appear to equate wanting to be a
lawyer with wanting to be a good lawyer—a skillful lawyer,
a successful lawyer, a winning lawyer, a decent and ethical
lawyer, a lawyer who knows the craft—a lawyer, in short,
who is admired by other lawyers and by judges who are in a
position to recognize the difference between a good lawyer,
worthy of emulation, and a mediocre or poor one, worthy of
at best silent pity, and at worst contempt.
In nearly every large course I have taught for
significantly more than the past few years, a time comes in
the semester when I have the urge to deliver a message:
“Unless you plan to live a life as a river pirate standing aside
the routine legal transactions of daily life with your hand out
to collect a toll, you misunderstand what it is to be a good
lawyer. Good lawyers are not paid for delivering certain
answers to routine questions. Good lawyers earn the big
bucks you all hope to make by putting their butt on the line,
by exercising the best possible judgment in circumstances
where answers are unlikely and advice only possible in terms
of better or worse alternatives.” Forty years ago, this
message might have secured many students’ attention. They
might have looked up as knowing smiles crept across their
faces. “That’s right,” they might have said to themselves
silently, “I am here to become good lawyer; help me to learn
to exercise good legal judgment.” Twenty years ago not as
many would have sat up and taken notice. Lately, should I
choose to deliver that message, it distressingly comes out
sounding more like a plea and elicits from my students not a
jolt of self-recognition, but an equally palpable sensation of
distanced curiosity. How strange, they think to themselves;
what can any of this law possibly have to do with the exercise
of judgment?
Here, historical and economic explanations of this
phenomenon do not suffice. Those who undertake to train for

454

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

a profession, and invest considerable time and money in the
enterprise, yet do not aspire to provide their clients with the
best possible judgment available to the profession for which
they train, suffer from something more than a set of poor
incentives; they suffer from a defect of character.
Even if it is true that the practice of law in the world our
students will inhabit is desultory and bureaucratic, it is one
thing to recognize that one’s professional life rarely will
afford opportunities to practice law creatively and
satisfyingly, and quite another to reject as irrelevant the
acquisition of the craft necessary to do so should the
opportunity arise. In truth, the only thing that has
distinguished practicing law from flipping burgers, in any
era, has been, not the daily absence of tedium, but the fact
that perhaps once a month, a lawyer may face a problem that
cannot be handled by resort to the formulaic responses and
the boilerplate that lawyer has deployed a hundred times
before. Judgment, craft, creativity, and even wit occasionally
may be found highly useful, even if not strictly required. The
cubicle-warrior, in contrast, may pass an entire career
without ever facing a problem that demands or even invites
the exercise of any interesting kind of occupational
judgment.
If law students were in a position to understand what
skills they need to acquire and to what degree of proficiency
in order to have a chance of practicing law well in those
moments, rare or otherwise, that permit or invite the
exercise of satisfying agency—those moments that confirm
one’s very humanity—their lack of interest in what a good
legal education would require of them might be understood
merely as a lack of understanding. But students are, of
course, by definition, in no position to understand such
questions and so their impulses must arise from other
sources. Two factors suggest themselves.
First, it seems that students no longer believe in the
value, or even the instrumental utility, of hard work. Or
perhaps, it is that their conception of hard work is different
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from mine. To today’s students, work appears to mean the
willingness to sit at a computer clicking around the internet
until the answer to some question is located. It follows for
such students that hard work consists of clicking around the
internet for as long as it takes to find the answer. The idea
that hard work might consist of exploring the contents of
one’s own head seemingly occurs to a few of them or, if it does
occur to them, they evidently discard it as implausible on the
ground that cultivating the skill of independent, critical
thinking is nothing a teacher could possibly have reason to
demand.14 In any event, they do not very often exhibit the
kinds of behavior that I think of as hard work: close,
laborious, critical reading of texts; careful and self-critical
reflection; and, repeated practice in basic analytic thinking.
Instead, they are intellectually passive and dependent;
everything must be provided to them, pointed out to them,
explained to them. Nothing is for them to discover, and in so
doing, to learn the art of discovery. They must not only be
told what to do, but also reminded repeatedly to do it. To
provide them with information in, say, a syllabus in the

14. Some of my interlocutors have asked me to explain what I mean by
“critical thinking.” I have hesitated to do so because of the way that this
seemingly ordinary activity from my youth has been debased in the high school
and college of today, as well as highjacked as an indication of merit (or demerit)
in various political debates of academic topicality. The use of “critical” in Critical
Theory, Critical Marxism, and Critical Legal Studies has not been helpful either.
But out of deference to good friends, here goes.
Critical thinking is the activity of reading against (and sometimes across) the
grain, whether the grain is that of written materials, understandings of human
behavior, or of human institutions in an attempt to gain a different perspective
(sometimes erroneously described as a deeper or truer perspective) as to how,
why, or wherefore these objects act or are intended to act. Critical thinking is
often seen as inherently derived from particular, assumedly totalizing social theories—such as structuralism, Freudianism, various Marxisms, economisms or political preferences, but such a stereotypical identification is unnecessary and perhaps inimical to critical thought. Rather, critical thinking is simply skeptical (but
hopefully not corrosively so) thinking that refuses to take surface understandings
for granted, but instead requires that they, as well as alternative understandings,
be supported only after being put under serious intellectual pressure designed to
identify possible weaknesses or errors before putting those understandings into
use.
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expectation that it will stay provided is, in their view, a kind
of magical thinking. The entire burden of their progress
depends on their teachers who are in charge of their
education, and thus, of their success. If they fail, it is because
their teachers have failed.
Sadly, evidence of the value of old-fashioned, selfmotivated hard work is, at least for the moment, all around
students, if only they could perceive it. There are always
some students, often older, usually with prior work
experience, who understand that they are capable of
affecting their futures through the exercise of personal
agency, and that doing so requires exertion, initiative, and
some degree of enterprise. These are the students who
impress their professors and, if they work during law school,
their employers. They collect a disproportionate share of
available opportunities, not because they are smarter or
luckier, but because they demonstrate to people in a position
to know that they have the makings of truly good
practitioners. Much comes to them because they deserve it.
Even among students who have some vague appreciation
of the value of self-motivation and enterprise, the concept is
sometimes bizarrely mistranslated. Students increasingly
seem to believe that the kind of enterprise they should
exhibit consists in pounding the pavement endlessly to
scrounge up work of any kind, no matter how worthless, or
even inimical, to their development as professionals. They
call this “building a resume.” In reality—or at least what I
would like to believe is reality—the kind of enterprise in
which they should invest their time consists instead in
finding opportunities to hone a degree of professional craft
that will, in the end, make them desirable for what they can
actually do, as opposed to what they can say they have done.
Second, it seems that students no longer see a connection
between what teachers do, in or out of the classroom, and
what they do, or can imagine themselves doing in or out of
the classroom. Perhaps they are no longer capable of
perceiving who we are, or the relationship between our
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characteristics as persons and as professionals, or between
our characteristics as persons and professionals and our
behavior. The notion that in their daily life teachers are
learners and that what we do best is to help students learn,
as they will have to do pretty much on their own for the rest
of their life, seems to be impossible for students to
comprehend. Instead, they seem to think of us as simply
“professors,” members of a class of artificial entities, like
video game avatars, that have been designed by young people
a lot like themselves to help them check off the requirements
for a license to practice law—itself evidently a strange relic
of a bygone era about as comprehensible as a shiny black
monolith on the lunar surface. Teachers are incarnate
Wikipedias—sources of information, at least when behaving
themselves; things to be clicked on periodically should a
question require an answer. The perverse insistence that our
students acquire professional skills and knowledge through
their own hard, independent, though not unassisted, work,
and our puzzling refusal to buy the ingredients, cook the
meal, set the table, and wash the dishes makes us, perhaps,
like some kind of bad hyperlinks, annoying malfunctions, the
proper response to which is to browse elsewhere for better
and more responsive sources.
V
With this understanding of law students and legal
practice established, at least to my satisfaction, it should be
obvious that living in such a world might create problems for
a teacher. In order to help other teachers address these
problems, I offer first an Aristotelian approach to them that,
while not congenial to me, is congenial to other teachers I
know.15 I follow with my own approach.
15. My Aristotelian teacher is not a straw man to bat at, but rather my
synthesis of conversations with several teachers whom I have respected over
many years. I know that there are many possible frameworks for approaching
the problems identified in this piece, but I would be unable to present most of
them empathetically and so I have simply limited myself to this one and my own.
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An individual who thinks about teaching through an
Aristotelian lens16 sees the professional world as populated
by roles, and believes that success is to a significant degree
properly understood as a matter of how ably an individual
performs the role inhabited. The most obvious role for a
teacher of lawyers is that of a successful, high-performing
lawyer. Central to that role is the idea of precisely what the
best work of such a lawyer would comprise. A teacher who
subscribes to this image of the highest quality of lawyering
believes she is obliged to attempt to lead her students to
embrace it. It prominently centers upon the kind of mastery
of handicraft described earlier, but it also includes something
more. She does not confine her teaching to what she thinks
will be useful to her students as practitioners, but also feels
obliged to teach them what will be useful to them as citizens,
and particularly citizens of a democracy, and even more
particularly as lawyer-citizens, who occupy a somewhat
unusual socio-political niche. What law students therefore
most need to be taught is the discipline and practice of
critical thinking, and indeed of critique itself, the model of
good teaching she inherited from her best teachers in high
school, college, and law school, and from her best mentors in
the working world.
The difficulty for an Aristotelian teacher, however,
consists of this. Students, she has come to suspect, au fond
no longer genuinely respect such an objective, and in
consequence discount the value of such teaching. Because
they do not respect such a teacher, they do not admire her,
and because they do not admire her, they do not seek to
I invite my readers, should there be any at this point, who are not comfortable
with the alternatives I present, to address these problems though their own
favored frameworks. It is the problems that are important. I offer my
observations on them as a starting point, not a self-evidently correct solution.
16. For me, this individual has no gender. However, the genderless pronoun
“it,” while in some ways attractive, is surely inappropriate. In the interest of
clarity, because I am male, I have chosen to use the female. My choice should not
be taken to imply anything about with which Aristotelian teachers I have spoken,
or to imply that female teachers are by nature Aristotelian.
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emulate her. Yet by failing to emulate her, they cut
themselves off from a good deal of what she has to offer as a
teacher: everything she models, everything she embodies—
that is to say, the most valuable things she possesses and is
capable of sharing. For such a teacher, success depends
fundamentally upon her students’ willingness to say to
themselves one thing, and one thing only: “Here is a good
lawyer. I want to be like her.” Everything else follows from
that, and nothing is possible without it.
Proceeding from this premise, the Aristotelian teacher
affirms that in order to teach a student critical thinking, that
student, to accept the lesson, must first accept that the
teacher is capable of thinking critically in a way that is worth
emulating—that the teacher is not, for example, just a
liberal, or a Democrat, or un-American, or self-important or
a complete jerk, and so that what that teacher is teaching
really is critical thinking—the genuine concept—and not
merely some whiny rant that can be written off and ignored.
Thus, for such a teacher, her character is her most valuable
asset. She cannot teach the lessons she really wants to teach
unless she can be perceived as someone authentically
capable of delivering it.
Questions of purpose aside, assuming that they can ever
be set aside, the phenomenology of the Aristotelian teacher’s
ideal teaching involves being “in the zone”—attaining a level
of contextual awareness and in-the-moment mastery that
allows the teacher to direct things wherever she wants them
to go, even if she is in some trivial sense extemporizing (at
least that is how it feels, even if it’s an illusion). “In the zone,”
teaching is one of the great liberating pleasures. When, from
time to time, the pleasure is absent, when in her lowest
moments, such a teacher feels unsuited to the task at hand.
The Aristotelian teacher, consistent with the
understanding of the American university offered above,
knows that once there were plenty of students who believed
in the value of critical thinking, who had internalized it as a
way of life, who aspired to improve the quality and
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persuasiveness of their critical thinking, and who recognized
her services as valuable. However, such a teacher sometimes
believes that we no longer inhabit a society in which critical
thinking is valued and so there is a stark difference between
her generation and the current one. Her generation did not
reject conformity tout court (though they said they did), but
they did reject as illegitimate a life lived in slavery to a
certain kind of corporate consumerism. That we have
choices, that we have the freedom to refuse to do what we are
told—these were their insights.
In contrast, the generation now sitting in law school
classrooms has different instincts. They do not reject slavery,
but on the contrary seek enthusiastically to enslave
themselves as quickly and completely as possible. They do
not wish even the illusion of freedom of choice in fashion,
music, gadgets, politics, ideology, or anything else; they want
precisely what they are told (in every waking moment, alas)
to want. The idea that not wanting these things is even a
choice on the conceptual map is beyond not only their
experience, but also their comprehension. Capitalism has
indeed finally consumed itself: those who mindfully built the
pillars of consumerism have succeeded in creating a species
of individual who lives, and can live, only to consume, no
longer to build.
The sense of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
establishing the Aristotelian relationship between teacher
and student makes it difficult for a teacher who accepts,
indeed embraces, such a relationship to experience the
concomitant Aristotelian sense of life in which, for the
virtuous person, desire is in harmony with practical reason.
And, it is this sense of harmony of desire and reason that is
essential to a life well lived. Thus, if the point of teaching is
the demonstration, and so transmission, of the skill of critical
reasoning and the student is incapable of acquiring this skill,
or somehow sees it as irrelevant, then the teacher cannot
properly teach. The activity is literally pointless and so
might well be abandoned as unworthy of either party. Each
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might better pursue some other objective.
In contrast, I am not an Aristotelian. I believe in neither
nature nor essence, though have always a bit jealous of those
who do. A true child of the Sixties, though not a chronological
one, I have never seen a role that I wholeheartedly wished to
occupy, much less to inspire others to occupy, at least in any
conventional way. Indeed, for me the point of critical
thinking is challenging, if not destroying, such roles, such
understandings of appropriate behavior. And, I have never
known a harmonious existence and long ago gave up on even
its possibility. A fragmented, conflicted life is all I can
envision. The notion of being taken as a master, someone
whose attributes a student might wish to emulate, frightens
me. At most, I wish to be seen as a learner just a bit farther
down the road toward understanding and so at times
something as simple as being called “Professor” can bring the
filing of a stern demurrer with the observation, “I profess
nothing and the notion that I do would deeply offend anyone
who actually did.”
Instead, I teach, first, because doing so is fun—it brings
me joy, or at least still does from time to time. Second, I teach
because teaching is also a contribution to the civilization that
tolerates me, an activity undertaken in exchange for the time
to write. I am not therefore unserious. For me, learning has
always been fun, but serious, often hard fun. Indeed,
knowing how hard learning is, I find it difficult to
understand how or why, after some point in school, possibly
somewhere between tenth and twelfth grade, anyone might
continue to study a subject beyond a desultory introduction,
unless it was at least interesting, even if not fun.
As it is interesting to learn, to come to understand, how
people do things in the world, it was for just this reason that
I was attracted to law as a practice. Law is fun because on
the surface it is a very complicated, multifarious practice,
and yet underneath, it can be reduced to a rather simple set
of concerns, “a powerful theory” as I like to say. For my entire
teaching career, I have more, but often less, successfully
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tried to identify that theory and communicate it to my
students.
As I indicated earlier, my image as a teacher is of
someone who comes to class, not to teach, and especially not
to convey information, but to help students learn. Thus, I am
most comfortable in a large classroom answering questions,
not asking them, in an attempt to help students come to
understand what they might have learned from the material
assigned for the day. The underlying theory is simple. If
bewilderment can be removed, learning may more likely take
place. Of course, such an understanding of the law
professor’s role depends on the willingness of law students,
many of whom are twenty-two years old, to take charge of
their education, to be available to learning, a phrase that I
have derived from David Matza’s work.17
Matza speaks of adolescents as available to delinquency,
as individuals for whom delinquency is one of a range of life
options that might plausibly be explored.18 During all of my
years as an academic, I have experienced students who were
clearly, even passionately available to learning. These
students were, and still are, a joy to have in class. They have,
however, never been the majority in any large class. The
majority has never been available to learning. It still is
unwilling to take charge of its education. Unfortunately,
while in the seventies the minority of students who were
available to learning was respectably large and so
established the tone of the classroom experience, as the
eighties passed slowly into the 2010s, that minority slowly
declined in numbers. Now it is seldom sufficient to set the
tone in any classroom where helping students to learn is the
dominant objective.
The decline in the percentage of students available to
learning that an Aristotelian teacher might experience is
just as big an obstacle for what I choose to do in the classroom
17. DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 69 (1964).
18. Id.
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as it is for her, though in a different way. This is because the
object of my teaching is different from the Aristotelian’s. I
respect her understanding of the importance of character for
teaching law and learning what it is to be a lawyer, as well
as her objective of teaching critical thinking. However, for
me, character implies a role dependence that I have a
difficulty accepting, much less exhibiting for others, and
though I try to help students improve their limited skills in
critical thinking, such an activity is a mediate objective. For
me, the ultimate objective of critical thinking is to help
students to begin to exercise judgment, an attitude toward
law that is different from, but related to, the Aristotelian’s
emphasis on coming to understand the character required to
be a good lawyer. It is judgment that distinguishes the office
of a lawyer from that of a tollgate operator. And so, the point
of the practice of law may best be seen as the use critical
thinking about first, the vast background of institutions,
understood historically, structurally, culturally, and
philosophically, that pervade human activity, next, about the
foreground of client desires, and finally about the available
scraps and pieces of rule systems, as a basis from which to
fashion an effective arrangement that harmonizes, as best as
can be done, all three. This is what judgment does and its
exercise equips a practitioner with the ability to distinguish
that course of action that “will work” from that course of
action which “isn’t likely to work” and especially to identify
the third, fourth, or fifth alternative course of action that at
first might be rejected, but in the end may seem to be “just
the thing.”
The subject of judgment can be various: a merger, a
regulatory filing, a financing package, a property settlement,
a plea agreement, a complaint, a brief, a trial strategy, the
structure of a financial instrument, or a business plan. All
require judgment, a matter of more or less, a matter of taking
ownership of a problem and so accepting responsibility for
the quality of the solution proffered, rather than merely
deferring to “the law.” More crudely put, it is the act of
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putting one’s butt on the line. A lawyer who exercises
judgment accepts the risk that the advice given will be less
than optimum, even wrong, and so accepts the blame that
follows from poor judgment. Thus, for the exercise of
judgment—as distinguished from “just” filing routine
papers—a lawyer is entitled to be paid well, even when no
question of malpractice could possibly arise.
Unfortunately, most of my students seem not only
uninterested in exercising judgment, they are absolutely
adverse to it. Somehow instinctively understanding that they
are likely to be fodder for someone else’s war, they just want
to put in their hours and get paid. Their preference is for
what my one-time colleague Tom Disare called “the risk-free
practice of law,” even though they also somehow know that
it is only by taking responsibility for their work that they
have the chance to secure the semi-permanent employment
that has been the object they have been seeking for all the
years on the treadmill that is K–16 education.
Trying to convince these students to accept the
obligation of exercising judgment is very hard, often futile
work. This work has been made harder by their palpable
longing to continue to do what they have been taught to do
for so many years by an educational system that has done a
rather wonderful job of socializing students into American
life, but has done a truly awful job of providing them with
the tools necessary for critical thinking, all the while
regularly grading and sorting them on the basis of the ability
to do what they are told for intentionally predictable
rewards.
Why this is so is relatively easy to understand. For years
of education, nothing has been asked of those who become
my students. Of course, in this statement, I use “asked” in a
particular way. Nothing open-ended has been asked of them.
I readily acknowledge that in fact much has been asked, but
only in a peculiar, routinized form. For most of my students,
for most of their education up until they reach my classroom,
they are regularly asked to do the following task. The teacher
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tells the student exactly what is to be taught, preferably in
clear outline form, so that the student knows exactly what
needs to be mastered, and how mastery, defined as the
receipt and retention of information, will be tested, most
often in a way that makes easy the transfer of the
information from an outline to the test. This is a popular art
form in that it makes it easy to grade students and provides
a handy defense to objections directed toward the accuracy
of that grading on the part of those helicopter parents who
believe that their Dick or Jane is destined to be great because
they are already “perfect,” or would be were they adequately
taught.19
Most students are also asked to master the skill that is
the response paper, of saying something “smart” in response
to a carefully chosen, generally bland and so inoffensive,
“prompt.” Such exercises are justified as allowing for
creativity and self-expression and so not graded, or if graded,
generally graded in terms of the relevance of the response to
the prompt, the intellectual equivalent of learning to color
within the lines.
Both of these skills are moderately useful, but emphasis
on such varieties of learning entails a rather unfortunate
consequence. Students find that doing what they are told and
so eschewing the exercise of individual judgment is not their
second nature, but their only nature. Never having been
allowed to set their own goals except in trivial matters—I
really want to go to this or that movie—they find it all but
impossible to figure out how one might engage in critical
thinking as way of exercising judgment.
In some ways, I am not surprised by this pattern to K–
16 education; my education was much the same until

19. Given this understanding of learning, it is not surprising that when asked
to do a research project, that project is defined as the collection and ordering of
material assembled for the purpose—you must have six, eight, ten, . . . pick a
number, sources, properly cited in your bibliography—thus reducing a possible
exercise of judgment to a glorified scavenger hunt.
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towards the end of high school.20 However, by then, the
importance of critical thinking, of looking at accepted
understandings of things in the world from the outside/in the
third person/critically, though we never used any of those
locutions, was increasing stressed. And in college, after
completing the introductory courses in most any field other
than math or science, critical thinking was the point of most
courses offered by most instructors.
However, if I am to judge on the basis of my experience
of most of my students, emphasis on critical thinking as an
educational objective seems no longer to be experienced by
many students in many majors at many colleges, regardless
of whatever an individual department or the university as a
whole may say in its advertising brochures. When asked to
respond to any material or faced with an open-ended task—
be it doctrinal, where it would take years of work to master
it all, were that even possible, or worse, processual—work to
become a good lawyer or to exercise judgment—students, and
not just first year students, seem to think that the task
identified is to repeat what the material said and so are
bewildered when they discover that this is not the case. At
best, they are indignant that that they should not have been
told or cannot quickly find the answer before any question is
asked. Very often, and not wholly surprisingly, such students
freak. All they have to damp down the panic are their old,
tried and true skills, and they complain bitterly when it
becomes apparent that such skills are simply not up to the
task placed before them. Rationalization often follows: “I just
need to work harder with my existing skills; this teacher is
just hiding the important secrets from me.” Or overt denial:
“This can’t be what the practice of law is about; this teacher
is simply out of it.”
Those who do not freak often attempt to reinterpret the
task as requiring the oral equivalent of a response paper, as
perhaps an occasion for law school “policy” analysis. If
20. Thankfully, the response paper did not then exist.
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deprived of this possibility, students have a hard time
understanding that there might be anything else they could
do. If it finally dawns on them that they are required to
exercise independent judgment based on critical thought,
they mostly recoil in horror as if some sanctum sanctorum
had been invaded, as if the task was far harder than even
asking someone of another gender to dance at the first
middle school party. Even worse, some students confuse
critical thought with the contemporary version of critique, a
version that Kant could not have possibly identified with,
that offers stereotypical understandings of why
interpersonal, social, or economic life is radically deficient
with respect to some aspect of an assumedly “natural” order.
I have a certain amount of sympathy for these responses
from the majority of my students and for three reasons. First,
I would be dumbfounded were it to turn out to be the case
that so many of my students were congenitally incapable of
critical thought. It is far more likely that they suffer from a
college education that failed to stress the importance of such
open-ended thought. Whether the reason for this
marginalization of such thought is the diminution of the size
of college faculties as administration takes over the
campuses, the obsession of faculty with the necessity of time
for research, a fear of faculty and administrators alike of
exercising judgment themselves and so of offering judgments
about their student’s thought, the preference of one and all
to avoid the trouble of individualizing education that an
emphasis on critical thinking necessarily implies, the social
reduction of the college and the college degree to a credential,
or even all of these quite obviously related aspects of higher
education today, I surely cannot establish. However, I am
sure that this marginalization is what daily I face in my
teaching and it makes me sad.
Second, the great social and economic shift that has
turned the acquisition of a professional degree from the mark
of membership in the upper-middle class to but a ticket to
the possibility of such class membership has meant that
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protecting one’s GPA, long a staple of an undergraduate life
spent managing the college experience,21 is now just an
ordinary part of a life spent managing the law school
experience, at least at all but maybe the most elite few law
schools. The time required to begin to be able to learn with
but minimal help, to make oneself available to learn, to start
working on being a good lawyer who is capable of exercising
sound judgment founded in critical thinking skills, quite
obviously detracts from time spent worrying about grades,
fattening one’s resume with activities and employment
experiences, as well as having fun, mating, and even dating.
Learning is thus easily tossed overboard, yet again
postponed until . . . until some other dimly perceived future
when there will be time for such things.
Third, to be caught on an educational treadmill for at
least the nineteen years from kindergarten through the bar
exam is surely an exhausting educational marathon. And,
“please keep it simple” is a plausible prayer as the finish line
approaches. However, most lawyers will spend some portion
of the rest of their lives confronting open-ended tasks that
require the exercise of critical thinking skills, among them
learning on their own. Surely, by the time a student enters
law school, it is necessary to begin to engage in such
activities, lest the necessary effort at learning, and hopefully
mastery, take place at a client’s expense.
Sympathy might ever be my dominant response to my
students were it not for one other crucial detail. Just when is
such learning going to start? When will judgment be
acquired? And, at whose expense? These are important
questions for a law teacher. We attempt to prepare students
for the practice of law, not for practicing doing law on paying,
much less nonpaying, clients.
How does one who is without an Aristotelian teacher’s
grounding, evaluate the plausibility of the teacher’s task in
21. REBEKAH NATHAN, MY FRESHMAN YEAR (2005) is excellent on the topic of
students “managing college.”
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such circumstances? The question for me is not whether one
can be a teacher in any given set of circumstances, but
whether being a teacher in a given set of circumstances is a
tolerable task rather than a pure sinecure of the “I pretend
to teach and they pretend to learn” variety, something
unworthy of even an ill-ordered life tolerably lived—
something so devoid of joy that one is no longer capable of
honestly believing that one is making a contribution to the
civilization that tolerates one in exchange for the time to
write.
In answering this question, I know that I cannot just
consider the exchange made—teaching for writing. I must
also consider the situation of the individuals not placed, but
thrust into my care. They did not create the world in which
they find themselves and it is highly doubtful that they
would have chosen it had they been given a choice. It is ugly
to find oneself in a world where social advance, or even
maintenance of social position, requires twenty years of an
education that is not intrinsically attractive leading to not
very secure employment opportunities doing work that is not
all that interesting. And so, I believe that it is important to
recognize a possible obligation derived from the fact that I
benefited from experiencing a world of both study and
practice that presented a far less demoralizing prospect than
the one my students today experience. It helps that, in a real
sense, I like my students and would be more than willing to
express such affection were they open to it. But it is not clear
that that liking is enough. Understanding, even when
combined with affection, does not equate with psychic
reward. From the front of the room, the decline in the size of
the group of students available to learning is as dispiriting
to me as is the increasing difficulty of establishing the proper
relationship between teacher and student for the
Aristotelian figment of my imagination. So, it is time to
return to Sicily and Tennessee and see whether these
fictional places can help illuminate the real problems that a
law teacher may face today.
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VI
Though my Aristotelian figment and I start from very
different understandings of what it is to teach, at this point
we find ourselves arguably lamenting the passing of an
understanding of what a life in the law should be that each
experienced to some extent, but should have then understood
was waning, not waxing. Both worry that the idea of the law
school that we know and love is “the centenarian being
dragged in a Bath chair” around a new world—human,
economic, and educational—”understanding nothing,” and
sad, if not embarrassed, to be so close to channeling Ortega
y Gasset22 in order to avoid the usual cliché about dead
languages and Oxbridge.
Still, it is a position that cannot be escaped. Nor should
it be. It is impossible to get as angry at the present world of
law teaching as we are without having deeply embraced the
job it implies. As such, I, and my Aristotelian figment, still
love the task of “guiding others” and note no change in the
intellectual quality of our students over the years of teaching
beyond that attributable to the sometimes random, lately
less so, variation around the norm. So, we are not in that
sense unhappy with our students. Rather, the change that
we do note over the years, the change that both angers and
saddens, is the significant change in students’ attitude
toward learning. And thus, we feel obliged to deal with the
changing circumstances under which we undertake to teach.
In seeking to explore the implied alternatives, we return to
Don Fabrizio and Ella, Tancredi and Chuck.
The choices that Tancredi and Chuck make are for me
and my Aristotelian figment impossible, but they need to be
addressed for just that reason. Tancredi chose to embrace the
abhorrent future because it was the lesser of two evils; “If we
22. JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT
Trans., 1932) (1930).
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want things to stay as they are, things must change.”23
Chuck faced a more ambiguous choice. While he came to
understand that the destruction of Ella’s way of life was
unfortunate, whether he came to agree with her that the
changes the TVA was bringing to the valley were the greater
evil or whether the white supremacist, good ole country boys
who had tried to run him off represented that evil is not at
all clear. And so, the meaning of Chuck’s high-tailing it back
to Washington with his new wife in tow is not clear either.
But, run he did, and on a fancy new airplane—a detail that
suggests that, for him, the past was the greater evil, in which
case he, like Tancredi, chose to embrace the future.
The deep perspectivalist view of life inherent in the
actions of these young men provides a helpful check on facile
theorizing. What is so wrong with the bureaucratization of
the practice of law? What is the evil to which it might be the
lesser alternative? It seems doubtful that the greater evil is
the abandonment of law. There seems to be no culture
without norms and some mechanism for enforcing them. The
norms may be abhorrent. The mechanism may be more or
less effective. But law there will be.
Instead, it seems more likely that the greater evil is the
possibility that a fully bureaucratic law would be a system
without play, without the space for tailoring the rules of law
to people and circumstances, a place where no one might be
able to build Ella a house on the hill above the river with a
porch for her rocking chair. This would be the hell where, in
Grant Gilmore’s words, “there will be nothing but law, and
due process will be meticulously observed,”24 a truly
totalitarian alternative, a system where categories
determine everything and all persons and their behavior are
already categorized.
In contrast, at some level, legal incompleteness allows
the hope that a system in which lawyers may do their work,
23.

DI LAMPEDUSA,

supra note 1, at 40.

24. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
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one that possibly may be manipulated, one in which in
Leonard Cohen’s words, “There’s a crack, a crack in
everything. That’s how the light gets in,”25 might indicate the
possibility of the individualized “better,” “more just”
outcomes I worked for in practice. Many Aristotelians did
too. It is a place where a really good lawyer might make a
really good argument, a place where judgment might be
exercised. And, it is in consequence a place where selfconscious, critical reflection might lead to the belief that
character matters, and thus that individual agency may play
some role, however slight, in remaking the world.
If this is so, if a fully bureaucratic law is the greater evil
to be feared, then neither my Aristotelian figment nor I can
imitate Tancredi and Chuck. We cannot run toward the
future that, as Don Fabrizio knew, needed “bright young
men, with minds asking ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ and who are
good at masking, at blending . . . their personal interests
with vague public ideals.”26 No longer is the optimism that
sought the growth of modestly democratic government, as
well as modestly benign regulatory guidance, available to us.
To paraphrase Pogo, “we have seen the future and it is us.”27
And so we must face the differing postures of Don Fabrizio
and Ella Garth toward an unpalatable future.
Of the two, it is Ella’s actions that are the more
surprising. The Don allows aristocratic privilege to do the
tough work of opposition for him; he may affect aged
tiredness or aged wisdom as he wishes—“being dragged in a
Bath Chair around the Great Exhibition.”28 He allows rank
to set aside discomforting questions, secure in the knowledge
that while his patrimony will continue to decline, for the
present, his position will not be questioned. He may in this

25. LEONARD COHEN, ANTHEM (Columbia Records 1992).
26.

DI LAMPEDUSA,

supra note 1, at 209.

27. See Walt Kelly, Pogo Earth Day Poster (Apr. 22 1970) (originally, Pogo
said, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”).
28.

DI LAMPEDUSA,

supra note 1, at 205.
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sense continue to “dress for dinner.” In contrast, Ella has
nothing but her person to hold the world at bay. Implacable,
stubborn, used to being obeyed and in her own way
respected, she has nothing to fall back on. When the Don
retreats to his country estate, he can retreat in style, a
caravan of coaches and a retinue of servants to pack bags and
lead the way. Ella has only a small suitcase. She relies on no
one, unwilling even to allow her granddaughter to carry her
bag. Like the Don, used to being obeyed, she orders Chuck to
get moving when he, perhaps ruefully, lags behind.
There is, of course, no federal marshal ordering either
my Aristotelian figment or me to get out of the way of
progress, as the marshal did by evicting Ella from her
island.29 Tenure means one may teach until the drool
becomes too apparent, if not beyond. Still, it is important to
highlight the attitudinal difference between Don Fabrizio
and Ella Garth. The Don, lacking “the faculty of selfdeception, essential requisite for wanting to guide others,”
asks only to be left alone to do that small bit of education that
he feels he is required to do.30 The world may easily make a
path around him. Ella stands squarely across the world’s
path and will step aside for no one and nothing, except in the
face of superior force. However, her attitude is made easier
by the fact that she has no more education she can do. Her
boys, actually nephews, clearly never learned anything
except to be afraid of her and the negroes have learned what
she could teach and await only her leave to depart.
And so there remains the irreducible nub of the problem
that faces my Aristotelian figment and I—whether it is more
29. At about this point, my readers will surely have begun to ask why I am
keeping up with the awful locution “my Aristotelian figment and I.” Why not say
“law teachers” and be done with it? The reason is simple. As I suggested earlier,
there are all sorts of ways to deal with the problem I am attempting to address.
In addition to embracing the future, others that come to mind are burying one’s
head in the sand, burying one’s head in scholarship, self-deception and political
activism. I could not write a proper apologia for any of these alternatives. And so,
I stick to the two positions I can modestly defend.
30.

DI LAMPEDUSA,

supra note 1, at 209.
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honorable to assume that the world will be content to make
a path around those who find themselves in its course,
around us, or to stand in the way recognizing that superior
force will eventually move us out of that course? Is it best to
dress for dinner, as did Don Fabrizio, or to close the door and
ignore the shouting outside, as did Ella?
Initially, this question can be avoided briefly by
remembering that routine activity is less costly than its
alternative. Interchangeable parts for the manufacture of
rifles and the assembly line for the manufacture of cars
reduced the cost of both items substantially. The cost of legal
services is an outrage. The cost of a middle class lifestyle
grows apace; an upper-middle class lifestyle is rapidly
becoming out of reach, even for professionals. The further
bureaucratization of legal practice will at least put off the
day when legal services can only be delivered to persons or
institutions that comprise the economic royalty or to those
that a government chooses to favor with a subsidy. Any such
putting off is probably a good thing. In this way, our students’
desire for the risk-free practice of law, their wish to avoid
confronting what it is to be a really good lawyer and their
hope to eschew judgment by embracing bureaucratic legal
practice is probably good for the social welfare of the
community concerned.
Whether it is an honorable thing for a teacher to tolerate
such behavior is another matter. An Aristotelian law teacher
would address three possible alternatives as follows. First,
one might simply abandon the field—that is, leave law
teaching altogether to pursue some other occupation. When
the population of students neither values nor desires what
the teacher believes to be the greatest gift she has to offer,
the teacher is obsolete in the most complete sense of the
term, so what else is there to do but step aside? The main
feasible alternative would be to return to the practice of law,
an endeavor that perhaps continues to offer some occasional
and scattered opportunities for honorable living, at least to
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the truly skilled. And for some, this is a live option—for they
are still very good lawyers, and the market for very good
lawyering has not yet entirely disappeared (if it ever will).
Reverting to one’s roots in practice might allow such
individuals to follow a path more like Don Fabrizio’s,
producing beautifully crafted work for an ever-shrinking
number of connoisseurs who will pay good money for it. After
a period of lucrative practice, one might be able to acquire
some moderately comfortable retirement home someplace
warm.
As part of this alternative, there might even be the nasty,
yet delicious fantasy of belatedly teaching students who did
not come to law school to learn how to be good lawyers, and
succeeded. An Aristotelian teacher could envision meeting
some of these derelicts in litigation and instantiating good
lawyering for them in a different way: by wiping the
courthouse floor with them. Still, such a lawyer might
wonder whether this activity might actually provide much
pleasure. It is not obvious that such ill-prepared law school
graduates are even capable of recognizing when they are
getting their asses kicked, an experience that demands the
recipient have at least some vague ability to recognize
artistry, even when it is inflicted on this no longer student’s
own sorry, ill-constructed, poorly supported case.
A second option is to bend so as not to break. This is the
kind of response, well known in today’s academy, which
demands that teachers “engage” their students by any means
necessary. If the students expect technology, give it to them.
If they want answers rather than questions, provide answers
and stifle the questions. If they think one should be available
around the clock, make one’s self available. If they think it is
reasonable to ask one to repeat a 45-minute lecture in one’s
office for their own private consumption, then it is
reasonable, and one should cheerfully do so. Ask of students
only what they are willing to give. Treat them like
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consumers, and the customer is always right.31 This is a
response, in other words, that allocates the burden of
behavior modification entirely onto the teacher; students are
fine—no, not merely fine; complete—just the way they walk
in the door.
Surely an Aristotelian teacher would find this
alternative abhorrent. Knowing the kind of behavior that is
required of good lawyers, and how to inculcate that behavior
in other human beings, such a teacher thinks she has a
better plan for transmitting mastery of his subject than her
students have for receiving it. This confidence is justified by
experience, knowledge, and results. Pandering is the
definition of dishonorable behavior in such a teacher; she will
not do it.
That seems to leave only one option: fighting the world
in place, while courting the risk of being broken. This was
Ella’s strategy, and an Aristotelian teacher might well
develop a pattern of action such as the following. Ban laptops
in classes. Count professionalism for twenty percent of the
grade in first-year courses. Use technology only when it
makes achievement of teaching goals easier, which is only
sometimes. Refuse to post things on the web merely because
students ask, but do so only for perceived pedagogical
benefit. Distribute a carefully thought out syllabus stuffed
full of information and hold students accountable for its
contents. Be direct and even blunt when providing
evaluations of performance. Maintain no presence on
Facebook at the knowing risk that for a certain kind of
student (and even for a certain kind of colleague) one
therefore does not fully exist. In doing these things, such a
teacher would fulfill the role of law professor, that is to say,
would act in accordance with her own understanding of what
31. Never mind that this idea flows from a kind of sad Boomer ahistoricism.
In fact, people under twenty-five treat you with the same degree of self-involvement regardless of which side of the counter they happen to occupy. The idea that
the customer is always right—and should therefore receive good and responsive
service—is one that is held mostly by people middle-aged and older.
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constitutes an excellent performance, judged solely by her
and based on her own conviction that on that subject, if even
on none other, she still knows what she is talking about. And,
on the day on which she ceases to feel that way, hope she will
have the courage to pursue the first option described above—
walking out the door.
In contrast, I can only see two choices. The idea of taking
up the practice of law again is ludicrous, and I am quite sure
that such is not a reasonable alternative for most other law
professors—the overly inbred show dogs that almost all are.
Nor have I any willingness to pander to my students’
asserted needs. Such an alternative demeans student and
teacher alike. So I am left with the stark choice between Ella
and the Don. Though I respect the Aristotelian urge to
channel Ella Garth, I cannot do it. Such an alternative is
unavailable to one who is not Aristotelian, though possibly
an Existentialist.32 So I am left to imitate—to channel is
impossible—Don Fabrizio.
To do the best one can is all that one can be asked to do
as a teacher, “to struggle to ignore parts of the given
structure of life,” as a colleague once put it. Pushing water
up hill is not something that most humans are able to do. I
know that I am not good at it. I can never hide
disappointment at a given student’s performance in class
and long ago stopped trying. Thus, the bureaucratization of
law, together with the tendency of law students to treat a law
degree as a credential and only secondarily as a learning
experience, just might be a gift to those teachers like me who
still see the practice of law as a species of handicraft. I teach
as if law were a species of handicraft, and for those who
might possibly so understand it. The trick then—Don
Fabrizio’s trick—is at the same time to harbor no illusions
about what is being learned, as well as no regrets that other
32. Errol Meidinger made this suggestion, which is not wrong, though it may
not be right.
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things are not being learned. Teach for the handcrafters,
those who are willing, however hesitantly, to take the risk of
exercising judgment, but grade for the credentialists, since
the handcrafters will need the credential too.
But is such a lesson to be learned from Don Fabrizio, if
it is the lesson he teaches, an honorable practice? Can
temporizing between the past and the future ever be
honorable? I believe that it can. The choice to be a teacher is
not a choice to give up one’s soul, something Ella Garth in
her different way knew. At the same time, it does carry with
it an obligation to treat students with a certain amount of
respect, knowing that there will often be a difference
between the respect that students believe that their views
are entitled to receive and the teacher’s understanding of the
question of dueness. In this circumstance, when that
difference cannot be bridged, it is at least possible to accord
each a certain space—for the teacher to accord students the
ability to move on and for the students to indulge the
teacher’s wish to dress for dinner, as it were, with such
students who wish to dress for dinner as well.
I recognize that from my first semester of teaching I have
faced this problem of differing perceptions about what
needed to be known in order to become a lawyer—in my
place, the rudiments of pre-trial practice; in theirs, personal
jurisdiction and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. I taught
what I thought important and lectured what they thought
important. Neither party was very happy, but I graded
generously, and so my students just grumbled rather than
started looking for tar and feathers. In most of my classes for
most of the many years since that experience, I have made
similar choices. Indeed, it is a choice emphasized by two
posters that graced my office for years: one was in Russian
from the years of the New Economic Program that, loosely
translated, exhorted the peasants to “[p]ull out weeds” and,
in the other, Snoopy noted, “I did not take this job just to rap
with the birds.”
For this reason, of course, I would not be surprised if
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others greeted my claim of honorable conduct with a certain
amount of suspicion. No one would ever say that I am a
popular teacher and almost all of the compliments about my
teaching have been delivered by former students, then
practicing lawyers, five or ten or even forty years after the
horrible experience. “I hated the course, but in time came to
understand and use what you were trying to teach us,” is a
not uncommon refrain. Thus, I see—understanding is a far,
far different matter—that the bureaucratic history of the
university and the economic embeddedness of the experience
of my students create limits to what I may accomplish when
working with them. And yet, they do not determine what, as
a teacher, I must do. For me, teaching is another example of
the Sisyphean struggle with the rock. A life well lived is not
the struggle to collect the most toys, but to keep pushing the
rock up the hill until gravity gets not just the rock, but also
the pusher. That is enough, for the Existentialist in me at
least.
Neither the Aristotelian figment of my imagination nor I
would argue with the other’s evaluation of these
alternatives. Both would, however, continue to ask, “shall we
dress for dinner or simply close the door until we are forced
to leave our island?” That is a good question for law
professors to face up to as U.S. News & World Report, the
Association of American Law Schools, the United States
Department of Education, the American Bar Association, our
own universities, and sometimes our own schools are busy
further diminishing the possible breadth of the activity of
teaching law.

